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Critics have charged that state competition in corporate law, which Delaware dominates, 
leads to a “race to the bottom” making management unaccountable.  One metric of 
management accountability is forced CEO turnover, which we use to test the race to the 
bottom hypothesis.  We compare California firms that choose to incorporate in California 
– the state with arguably the most restrictive corporate law rules – with those that 
incorporate in Delaware.  We show that aspects of Delaware law attract firms that plan to 
grow through merger or acquisition and are vulnerable to shareholder lawsuits.    We also 
document differences in corporate governance that correlate with Delaware 
incorporation.  On the ultimate question, we show that firms incorporated in Delaware 
are no less likely to terminate CEOs in the wake of poor performance.  Certain 
governance measures that correlate with Delaware incorporation increase likelihood of 
termination. The evidence presented here does not support the race to the bottom 
hypothesis.   
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we examine the relation between state corporate law and forced CEO 
turnover.  State corporate law determines most questions of internal corporate governance, such 
as the role of boards of directors and the allocation of authority between directors, managers and 
shareholders.  Under state corporate law, directors are charged with managing the business and 
affairs of the corporation.  Perhaps the most salient aspect of that responsibility is the board’s 
decision to hire or fire the CEO.  The decision to fire the CEO has taken on magnified 
importance in the last two decades, as the rate of CEO terminations has escalated sharply 
(Kaplan & Minton, 2012).  We focus here on that decision: Does state corporate law influence 
the decision to terminate the CEO?  
Companies have discretion in choosing their state of incorporation.  The allocation to the 
states of primary authority over corporate governance, when combined with the “internal affairs” 
doctrine, which holds that courts must apply the law of the state of incorporation to corporate 
law disputes, has created a regime of “issuer choice” in state corporate law.  Issuer choice allows 
corporations to choose their preferred state corporate law without regard to where the 
corporation is headquartered or principally does business. 
Issuer choice implies that states can compete to attract firms by offering the most 
attractive corporate law regime.  Delaware has clearly prevailed in the competition for corporate 
charters.  That state draws a clear majority of the nation’s largest public companies to 
incorporate under its corporate code, despite its relatively small population and share of the 
national economy.  In 2012, 90% of IPOs in the United States were incorporated in Delaware.1 
Subramanian (2002) suggests that the competition for corporate charters is largely bilateral: 
                                                 
1 Delaware Division of Corporations, 2012 Annual Report, at 2, available at 
http://corp.delaware.gov/pdfs/2012CorpAR.pdf. 
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states compete with Delaware in an effort to retain corporate charters.  This competition for 
corporate charters is not just about state pride: Winning the competition for incorporations yields 
tangible benefits in the form of charter fees.  Charter fees made up more than a quarter of 
Delaware’s tax revenues in 2012. 2 
Critics of issuer choice argue that Delaware competes for corporate charters by pandering 
to management.  Delaware has won this competition, according to this view, by leaving 
shareholders vulnerable to overreaching by corporate managers, who dominate the incorporation 
decision.  Most famously, William Cary (1974), a former SEC chairman, charged that states 
were caught in a “race to the bottom,” providing rules that undermine management 
accountability to shareholders.  The most salient form of management accountability in 
contemporary corporate governance is CEO firing.  Does Delaware incorporation promote 
governance structures that protect managers from involuntary termination? 
In this paper, we shed light on the relation between Delaware incorporation and forced 
CEO turnover.  Cary and other race to the bottom adherents argue that Delaware encourages lax 
monitoring.  If Delaware boards are inattentive, they will be less likely to hold CEOs 
accountable for poor performance.  To test this hypothesis, we first develop a model of 
incorporation choice based on salient differences between Delaware and California corporate 
law.  We focus on California because of its relatively strict corporate code and the pronounced 
exodus of California headquartered firms to Delaware found by Subramanian (2002).  If there is 
a race to the bottom, the clearest evidence should be found in firms migrating from California to 
Delaware.   
                                                 
2 Delaware Division of Corporations, 2012 Annual Report, at 2 (reporting that division collected “$867.2  
million dollars in fiscal year (FY ) 2012 and accounted for 26% of the State’s general fund”). 
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We argue – and demonstrate – that Delaware lures firms intent on growth through 
acquisition from California.  Mergers attract lawsuits, and growth firms also face a greater risk of 
securities fraud class actions.  Consequently, directors of growing firms may prefer Delaware’s 
predictable courts and surer protection against personal liability relative to California.  The 
downside of liability protections, however, is that they may reduce the incentive of directors to 
monitor management.  Cary (p. 686) notes in particular Delaware’s director-friendly standard 
regarding the duty of care and indemnification.  Since Cary wrote his famous article, Delaware’s 
duty of care standard has only been further diluted.  We document a number of differences in the 
corporate governance of Delaware and California firms, including pay and service on multiple 
boards, which may relate to the quality of monitoring by directors. 
Having shown that Delaware firms differ in their financial and governance 
characteristics, we examine the relation between Delaware incorporation and the likelihood of 
forced CEO turnover.  Overall, we find that Delaware incorporation is associated with higher 
rates of forced turnover.  In our multivariate analysis, we control for governance factors that 
correlate with Delaware incorporation and which are also likely to affect the likelihood of forced 
turnover.  After controlling for those factors, we find no evidence that CEOs of Delaware firms 
are less likely to be terminated than CEOs of California firms.  Our results suggest that choice of 
incorporation affects the turnover decision only indirectly through its influence on governance, 
but Delaware does not protect CEOs from firing.  We conclude that the evidence presented here 
does not support the race to the bottom hypothesis. 
We proceed as follows.  Section 2 compares Delaware’s corporate law with California’s 
and explores how those differences may appeal to firms with particular financial characteristics.  
Section 3 looks at reincorporations during our sample period, confirming the strong trend 
4
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identified in prior literature from California to Delaware.  Section 4 explores the relation 
between the choice of incorporation and firms’ financial and governance characteristics.  Section 
5 presents our analysis of forced CEO turnover.  We conclude with a discussion of our results in 
Section 6. 
 
2. State of Incorporation and Firm Characteristics 
Does Delaware corporate law differ from California in a way that is likely to appeal to 
firms with particular financial characteristics?  We argue that growth firms may prefer Delaware 
law because it facilitates acquisitions and offers directors sure protections against liability.  The 
latter inducement is relevant to the monitoring provided by Delaware directors. 
2.1. Facilitating/Discouraging Acquisitions 
One source of Delaware’s comparative advantage may relate to facilitating corporate 
combinations.  Romano (1985) finds that firms are likely to reincorporate in Delaware before 
committing to a program of mergers and acquisitions.  Delaware, with its doctrine of 
“independent legal significance,” gives corporations flexibility in structuring transactions.  This 
doctrine takes on practical importance in allowing acquiring corporations to avoid shareholder 
votes and appraisal rights in most circumstances.   
The flexibility that Delaware affords merging firms may be a particularly important 
factor explaining the exodus from California noted above.  California law affords voting rights to 
acquiring company shareholders not only in mergers, but also in asset and stock purchases (Cal. 
Gen. Corp. L. § 181(b) & (c), § 1200(b) & (c), § 1201(a)), if stock is used to complete the 
acquisition, and triangular transactions, if there is sufficient dilution of the parent company 
shareholders (Cal. Gen. Corp. L. §§ 1200(e) & 1201(a)).  California is also more generous than 
5
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Delaware in affording appraisal rights to acquiring company shareholders (Cal. Gen. Corp. L. § 
1300).  Thus, growing firms intent on making acquisitions might opt for Delaware law to 
eliminate voting and appraisal procedures with their attendant expense and delay.3  Celikyurt et 
al. (2010) show that newly public firms make acquisitions at a very rapid pace, so Delaware’s 
voting rules may be an important incentive for companies choosing their incorporation status at 
the IPO stage (the typical time for reincorporation), particularly if they anticipate rapid growth 
after going public.  On the other hand, more stable firms that plan to continue with an existing 
business plan would garner less benefit from reincorporating in Delaware and therefore would 
see less reason to pay the additional expense of Delaware incorporation. 
Firms interested in growing through acquisition may also be receptive to being acquired; 
growth is growth.  Daines (2001) presents evidence that firms are more likely to be acquired if 
they are incorporated in Delaware.  Both Subramanian (2002) and Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) 
find that states that have adopted anti-takeover statutes have more success in retaining the 
incorporations of firms headquartered there.  Kahan (2006), however, after controlling for other 
factors that might influence choice of incorporation – in particular liability protections – finds no 
evidence that firms are likely to incorporate in states with anti-takeover statutes.  Delaware has 
adopted an intermediate position with respect to anti-takeover provisions, but it clearly offers 
more protection than California, which arguably offers the least anti-takeover protection of any 
state.  California does not provide any explicit anti-takeover statutes.  Moreover, the validity of 
the poison pill has not yet been established there; the pill may run afoul of that state’s provision 
                                                 
3 Firms incorporated in California are also subject to cumulative voting (Cal. Gen. Corp. Law § 708), which is 
intended to afford minority representation on corporate boards.  Cumulative voting is unlikely to have much effect 
for firms with widely-dispersed shareholder bases, and California allows publicly-traded firms to opt out of the 
provision.  (Cal. Corp. Law § 301.5).  The opt-out is limited, however, to firms that are listed on the NYSE, Amex, 
or NASDAQ Global.  This means that many smaller public companies will be subject to cumulative voting, unless 
they opt to incorporate in Delaware or elsewhere at the time of their IPO.  They are unlikely to switch back to 
California when they grow large enough to be listed on a first tier exchange.  By that time the marginal cost of 
Delaware’s charter fees is unlikely to be an overwhelming burden. 
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precluding discrimination among shareholders (Cal. Corp. Code § 203).4  In Delaware, by 
contrast, the validity of the pill is firmly established.5  Insulation from hostile takeover may also 
insulate boards from shareholder pressure relating to the firm’s underperformance; if so, 
directors of Delaware firms may feel less pressure to terminate underperforming CEOs.  Our 
sample period has a dearth of hostile takeover, however, likely due to stock options which vest 
upon acquisition and golden parachutes, which have made most takeovers friendly. 
Consequently, we are skeptical that anti-takeover provisions play an important role in 
incorporation choice during our sample period.  In our view, CEOs face a much greater 
likelihood of being fired by the board of directors than falling victim to a hostile takeover. 
2.2. Liability protection 
Delaware may appeal to firms that anticipate greater exposure to shareholder lawsuits by 
offering liability protection to officers and directors.  Moodie (2004) documents that Delaware 
reincorporations surge after Delaware adopts liability protections for directors.  The lawyers who 
advise officers and directors are also likely to find liability concerns salient, and lawyers are the 
most common instigators of reincorporation decisions (Romano, 1985; Daines, 2001).   
Corporate officers and directors face liability from two primary sources: (1) breach of 
fiduciary duty under state corporate law; and (2) liability under federal securities law, which may 
arise in either an SEC enforcement action or in a private class action.  The latter is of 
                                                 
4 If the quest for anti-takeover protection were the primary motivation for fleeing California, Delaware seems an 
unlikely destination: the neighboring state of Nevada not only has a statutory language validating poison pills (Nev. 
Rev. Stat. §§ 78.195(5), 87.350(4), & 78.378(3)), but also gives director greater discretion in redeeming pills than 
Delaware does (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.139).  Moreover, Nevada not only has a business combination statute (Nev. 
Rev. Stat. § 78.438) with fewer exceptions than Delaware’s (Del. G. Corp. L. § 203), but unlike Delaware, it has a 
control share statute (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.379).  In addition to Nevada’s relatively stringent anti-takeover 
protections, it is also cheaper than Delaware for both franchise fees and potential litigation costs.  Thus, it seems 
unlikely that California firms choose Delaware incorporation for anti-takeover reasons. 
5 Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).  There are limits, however, on the type of pill 
that can be adopted; Delaware courts have held invalid dead hand and no hand pills.  Quickturn Design Systems, 
Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998). 
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considerably greater magnitude than the former.  State law can directly insulate officers and 
directors from liability for the former, and indirectly – through indemnification – from the latter. 
Under the corporate law of virtually every state, the combination of the business 
judgment rule and stringent demand requirements means that directors of public companies face 
little prospect of being held personally liable for their acts as directors (Black et al., 2006).  
Notwithstanding that low probability, directors may nonetheless view the possibility of being 
personally sued as particularly salient.  Suits for breach of fiduciary duty are common only in 
connection with mergers and acquisitions (Thompson & Thomas, 2004).  These suits typically 
allege that the directors have failed to exercise due care in selling the company or neglected to 
disclose all of the relevant facts.  Thus, state corporate liability is an important exposure only in 
connection with mergers and acquisitions, and even then, only for directors of the target 
corporation.   
When the Delaware Supreme Court did the unthinkable in Smith v. Van Gorkom6 — 
holding the directors personally liable in connection with an acquisition — the Delaware 
legislature quickly restored equilibrium by allowing corporations to eliminate money damages 
for duty of care violations in their charters (Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 102(b)(7)).  The Delaware 
legislature’s swift response actually accelerated reincorporations to Delaware (Moodie, 2004), 
particularly from California (Netter & Poulson, 1989).  Investors apparently favor this 
motivation for reincorporation: Heron and Lewellen (1998) find positive abnormal stock returns 
for firms reincorporating for the purpose of obtaining liability protections for directors.  This 
reaction suggests that shareholders: (1) recognize the role of such protections in attracting 
outside directors, and (2) are skeptical of arguments that shareholder suits encourage active 
monitoring by directors.  The comparative advantage provided by liability limits is enduring: 
                                                 
6 485 A.2d 858 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1985). 
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Kahan (2006) finds that states that have not adopted a liability limitation are significantly less 
likely to retain firms headquartered in their states.   
California affords directors less protection than Delaware.  California exculpates 
directors from liability for duty of care violations, but reckless acts are not covered (Cal. Corp. 
Code § 204(a)(10)(A)(iv)); Delaware does not exclude reckless acts.  Given the ease with which 
recklessness can be pleaded, this substantially limits the exculpatory force of California’s 
provision.  More recently, Delaware has allowed corporations to limit the scope of the “corporate 
opportunity” doctrine under the duty of loyalty.7  This provision likely appeals to directors who 
have a wide range of business interests, e.g., Silicon Valley venture capitalists.  California has no 
analogous provision. 
State law limits on liability for breaches of fiduciary duty cannot bar federal securities 
liability, which carries liability exposure orders of magnitude greater than state law.  For those 
claims, officers and directors must rely on indemnification and D&O insurance.  Once again, 
California stands out in offering officers and directors less protection: California law excludes 
indemnification for reckless acts (Cal. Corp. Code § 204(a)(11)).  Recklessness is the standard 
for liability under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act, the principal basis for federal 
securities claims in private class actions.  California also requires that the officer or director 
reasonably believe that their conduct was in the best interest of the corporation (Cal. Corp. Code 
§ 317(b)), rather than merely “not opposed” to that interest (Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 145(a)), so 
officers and directors cannot be confident of indemnification for federal securities liability. 
Delaware law, by contrast, is particularly generous on indemnification.  Defense 
expenses can be a considerable burden for an individual.  Officers and directors of Delaware 
corporation who prevail in a lawsuit against them, “on the merits or otherwise” have a statutory 
                                                 
7 Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 122(17).  
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guarantee of indemnity from the corporation for the expense of their defense, (Del. Gen. Corp. L. 
§ 145(c) (emphasis added)).  California law is more restrictive, omitting the “or otherwise” 
language, which likely excludes indemnification when the corporation pays the settlement.8  
Delaware also requires indemnification for partial success.9  These statutory guarantees are 
critical because they cannot be rescinded by successor boards if an officer or director is ousted, a 
common occurrence in the wake of a corporate scandal.  Moreover, they protect directors against 
SEC demands to preclude indemnification. 
The importance that Delaware places on indemnification rights – and the responsiveness 
of the Delaware legislature to any threats to the protections that it affords directors – is 
highlighted by the recent case of Schoon v. Troy Corp.10  In Schoon, the Delaware Chancery 
Court surprised many practitioners when it held that a corporate board could eliminate 
advancement rights to a former director with whom they had a legal dispute by amending the 
corporation’s by-laws.  After the Delaware Supreme Court declined to hear the case,11 the 
Delaware legislature quickly stepped to overturn the decision—approximately one year after the 
original decision.12  Clearly, Delaware recognizes the importance of indemnification. 
To be sure, differences in indemnification can be muted by D&O insurance policies, 
which go beyond indemnification in the range of conduct that can be covered.  Such policies are 
universal for public companies, but they are subject to contractual exclusions and coverage limits 
that may leave officers and directors vulnerable.  Of particular significance in connection with 
securities claims, insurers are unwilling to write policies in excess of $300-$400 million, a limit 
                                                 
8 See American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Schigur, 83 Cal. App. 3d 790, 793-794 (Cal. App. 1978) (construing 
California law to require a “judicial determination of the actual merits”). 
9 See Merrit-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1974). 
10  948 A.2d 1157 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
11 Bohnen v. Troy Corp., 962 A.2d 916 (2008). 
12 DGCL § 145(f) (providing that directors’ indemnification and advancement rights could be eliminated 
retroactively only if the rights explicitly allow for such modification) (adopted April 2009). 
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which is exceeded by several settlements each year, and smaller companies typically have much 
lower policy limits.  For directors facing parallel class actions and SEC enforcement actions, 
legal expenses can quickly burn through a substantial percentage of the policy limits.  Moreover, 
the contractual exclusions in D&O policies provide fodder for potential coverage disputes with 
the insurer.  These limitations mean that officers and directors of companies that may face 
securities lawsuits need to worry about both indemnification and insurance.  
Which companies, and which officers and directors, need to be most concerned with 
liability exposure in class actions and derivative suits?  With respect to state law liability, it is 
companies that anticipate the possibility of being acquired.  Daines (2001) finds that firms 
incorporated in Delaware are significantly more likely to receive a takeover bid and to be 
acquired.  For federal securities law liability, Johnson et al. (2007) show that lawsuit targets tend 
to be companies with larger market capitalization, more volatile stock prices, and higher share 
turnover.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers also target firms in industries that are R&D intensive with high 
variability of outcomes, such as the high tech and pharmaceuticals sectors.  Daines (2001) finds a 
significant positive correlation between R&D expenditures and incorporation in Delaware.  
CEOs face a real threat of being named as a defendant in a securities class action, as they 
frequently act as a spokesman for the company, thereby exposing themselves to direct liability.  
Outside directors have less exposure, but they can be on the hook for SEC filings, particularly 
registration statements for public offerings.  Thus, protection against liability may be a factor 
allowing Delaware firms to attract executives and directors, particularly if the firms have volatile 
stock prices and high share turnover.   
11
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The downside of protecting directors against liability, however, is that these protections 




In the previous section we developed hypotheses regarding the financial characteristics of 
firms likely to choose Delaware incorporation.  In this section we test our model of incorporation 
choice developed in the previous section by focusing on reincorporations, particularly from 
California.  We also compare the financial and characteristics of companies reincorporating in 
Delaware with those incorporated in California and other jurisdictions. 
3.1. Reincorporation Sample  
Our sample for this portion of the analysis (“Reincorporation sample”) consists of public 
companies changing their state of incorporation between 1992 to 2010 with data available on 
Compustat, which we rely on for all accounting data.  We initially identify the potential sample 
of reincorporations using news searches in Factiva, changes in incorporation in historical 
quarterly Compustat, changes in incorporation from one year to the next in Compact Disclosure 
(till 2004) and the Edgar text search engine (2007-2010).  Only reincorporation proposals that 
are approved by shareholders and can be verified using SEC filings are included in the sample.  
Reincorporations to or from a foreign country are excluded from the sample.  We hand-collect 
governance data for the reincorporating firms from Edgar, and hence this data is mostly not 
available for incorporations prior to 1996.  We provide variable definitions in the Appendix..   
Based on the bilateral nature of the incorporation choice documented by Subramanian 
(2002), we sort the Reincorporation sample firms into three categories of headquarters (“HQ”) 
12
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and incorporation: (1) Delaware; (2) California; and (3) Other.  Table 1, Panel A shows the flow 
of reincorporations. 
<<Table 1 here>> 
The reincorporation data confirm the exodus of firms headquartered in California to 
Delaware.  Out of 285 total reincorporations, 54 California HQ firms switched their 
incorporation from California to Delaware during our sample period, while only one California 
HQ firm switched from Delaware to California and three switched from Delaware to another 
state.  Another 19 California HQ firms switched their incorporation from Other states to 
Delaware during our sample period, thereby yielding Delaware 73 of the 79 reincorporations by 
California headquartered firms during our sample period.   
For Other HQ firms, 128 of the 206 reincorporating firms ended up in Delaware, with no 
firms opting for California.  The flow is not all in one direction:  more than a quarter of the Other 
HQ reincorporations (56) shifted their incorporation away from Delaware.  Of these, 38 shifted 
their incorporation to their HQ state.  These data confirm that incorporation choice is largely 
bilateral: HQ state or Delaware. 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics: Financial and governance characteristics 
Table 1, Panel B provides descriptive statistics on the financial characteristics of the 
reincorporating firms.  Column (1) focuses on California HQ firms that choose to reincorporate 
in Delaware, comparing those firms with firms that remain incorporated in California (Column 
(4)).  The firms that opt for Delaware have a lower book to market ratio, but somewhat worse 
operating performance.  They invest more in R&D, but the difference is only significant at the 
median.  They are also marginally fewer years away from their IPO.  Finally, the firms opting for 
13
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Delaware have greater institutional ownership.  Overall, it appears that the California HQ firms 
opting for Delaware have characteristics commonly associated with growth firms. 
Turning to characteristics commonly associated with potential exposure to lawsuits, 
volatility of stock returns is not greater for the firms opting for Delaware, but stock turnover is.  
In addition, the firms reincorporating to Delaware tend to be in industries with a higher 
proportion of takeover activity. 
We also report the financial characteristics of Other HQ firms that opted for Delaware 
incorporation during our sample period (Column (2)).  Overall, their profiles are similar to the 
CA HQ firms that reincorporated, with the exception of lower stock turnover and institutional 
ownership. 
Finally, we report the characteristics of firms that reincorporated away from Delaware 
during the sample period (Column (3)).  The salient feature of these firms is that they are not 
growth firms.  Compared to the Other HQ firms remaining in Delaware, they are much smaller, 
have a substantially greater book to market ratio, less R&D, lower stock volatility and turnover, 
and are in industries with less takeover activity.  They do, however, have better operating 
performance.  Overall, firms leaving Delaware do not appear to be looking to grow. 
Table 1, Panel C examines the governance characteristics of California and Other HQ 
firms that reincorporate in Delaware, along with firms that reincorporate away from Delaware.   
The boards of the California and Other HQ firms are similar, with the exception of director 
tenure, which is shorter for Other HQ firms.  Comparing the Other HQ firms reincorporating to 
Delaware, with those reincorporating away from Delaware, the only significant difference is 
board size, with those leaving Delaware having larger boards.   
3.3 Multivariate analysis 
14
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We next look at the reincorporation decision in a multivariate framework.  The first 
regression uses California HQ firms for its sample.  We use a logistic regression with the 
decision to reincorporate in Delaware as the dependent variable.  This variable is coded as 1 for 
firms that reincorporate in Delaware and 0 if they remain incorporated in California.  Based on 
the hypotheses developed in Section 2, we use the log of Total Assets, R&D, Book to Market, 
Takeover Activity, and Stock Volatility and for our independent variables.  The results are 
presented in Table 2. 
<<Table 2 here>> 
The coefficients for Takeover Activity and Stock Volatility are both positive and 
significant, at the five and one percent levels respectively.  This result supports the hypotheses 
that firms choose Delaware incorporation over California incorporation because of motivations 
relating to mergers and acquisitions and potential liability.   
The second set of regressions compares firms retaining Delaware incorporation with 
those abandoning Delaware incorporation to reincorporate elsewhere.  The dependent variable 
for this regression is coded as 1 if the firm retains its Delaware incorporation and 0 if the firm 
reincorporates in a state other than Delaware.  The results are consistent with our univariate 
comparison.  Firms with a lower book to market ratio are significantly more likely to retain their 
Delaware incorporation, confirming our supposition that firms leaving Delaware have limited 
growth potential.  The coefficients for the Takeover Activity and Stock Volatility are positive, 
although the latter is only marginally significant.  These results support the hypothesis that 
liability concerns are an incentive to retain Delaware incorporation. 
Overall, we find support for the hypotheses that firms reincorporate to Delaware to avail 
themselves of its flexible rules relating to mergers and acquisitions, as well as the protections 
15
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that it provides directors against personal liability.  If those concerns become less salient for a 
particular firm, it may then migrate away from Delaware and its higher charter fees. 
 
4. Incorporation, Financial Characteristics, and Corporate Governance 
The discussion in Section 2 suggests that Delaware may attract firms confronting legal 
issues related to growth and attendant volatility: voting rules, which may be important to firms 
planning rapid growth through acquisition, and protection against personal liability for officers 
and directors, which may be important both to firms contemplating a sale and those with highly 
variable returns.  The analysis of reincorporations presented in Section 3 is generally consistent 
with these hypotheses.  In this section, we compare the financial and governance characteristics 
of firms incorporated in Delaware with those incorporated in California and elsewhere.   
4.1 Sample description 
Our second sample draws on the Execucomp data set, which provides data on S&P 1,500 
firms (“Execucomp sample”).  Consequently, our sample firms are larger than the average public 
company and larger than the firms in our reincorporation sample.  We limit our sample to firms 
with CRSP share codes of 10 or 11.  We exclude closed end funds, which are subject to different 
governance regimes.  We also exclude firms incorporated in foreign jurisdictions.  Accounting 
data come from Compustat.  We get all returns measures and the delisting codes from CRSP.  
Governance variables are from Execucomp and IRRC.  Information about acquirers and targets 
comes from SDC. 
Because many firms choose to reincorporate in Delaware just prior to their IPO, this 
sample gives us a much broader picture of the implications of incorporation choice for corporate 
governance than our Reincorporation sample, which does not capture reincorporations before the 
16
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 93 [2008]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art93
  16
IPO.  California HQ firms incorporated in either California or Delaware remain the focus of most 
of our tests, as those firms present the clearest test of the race to the bottom hypothesis.  Do 
Delaware firms have weaker monitoring structures than California firms? 
4.1.1. Descriptive Statistics: State of Incorporation 
Table 3, Panel A breaks down our sample by state of incorporation and firm 
headquarters.  Consistent with prior work, we find that Delaware incorporated firms represent 
59% of the sample.  Also consistent with prior work, California is the conspicuous loser in 
retaining corporations.  Although California HQ firms make up 15% of our sample, firms 
incorporated in California constitute less than 3%, with 82% of the California HQ firms opting 
for Delaware.  By contrast, 54% of Other HQ firms are incorporated in Delaware. These 
percentages are similar to those reported by Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) for all Compustat firms.   
<<Table 3 here>> 
 Panel B of Table 3 offers descriptive statistics on the survival rates for firms in the 
sample.  Incorporation in Delaware does not appear to offer protection against takeover, although 
we do not formally test this proposition.  Slightly more of the Delaware firms left the sample due 
to mergers (42%), relative to the overall average (41%).  Firms incorporated in California are 
least likely to leave the sample due to acquisition (38%), which is consistent with Daines (2001).  
4.1.2. Descriptive Statistics: Financial and Governance Characteristics 
In Table 4, we present descriptive statistics for the financial and governance 
characteristics of the firms in the Execucomp sample, breaking the sample down by headquarters 
and state of incorporation.  In particular, we break the sample down into four categories: the first 
two are California HQ firms, incorporated in California and Delaware respectively; the second 
two are Other HQ firms, incorporated in Other states and Delaware respectively.   
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<<Table 4 here>> 
For the California HQ firms, we see the firms incorporated in Delaware are significantly 
larger.  Notwithstanding their larger size, the Delaware incorporated firms tend to have 
characteristics commonly associated with growth firms: lower book to market, greater research 
and development expenditures, fewer years have passed since their initial public offering, and 
lower dividend yield.  Delaware firms also operate in industries with greater takeover activity.   
Given these characteristics, it is not surprising that Delaware firms also have more volatile stock 
returns, a key indicator of vulnerability to securities class actions.  Delaware firms also have 
greater stock turnover, another factor for such suits.  Our univariate comparison does not, 
however, suggest that Delaware firms have greater litigation exposure: Delaware firms are sued 
no more often than those incorporated in California. 
The differences in financial characteristics for Other HQ firms generally follow the same 
pattern.  Delaware-incorporated firms in this sub-sample are more likely to show growth 
characteristics and characteristics likely to make them vulnerable to lawsuits relative to firms 
incorporated in other states.  For these firms, however, those incorporated in Delaware show a 
significantly greater incidence of lawsuit.  Overall, our univariate comparison of financial 
characteristics suggests that growth firms, in industries with more takeover activity, that are 
more vulnerable to litigation, are more inclined to incorporate in Delaware. 
Next we look at governance characteristics.  We are primarily interested in characteristics 
that may affect the likelihood of CEO termination for poor performance.  Starting with board 
characteristics, outside directors of the Delaware firms in our sample receive larger retainers.  
They also serve on a significantly greater number of boards than do the directors for the firms in 
other jurisdictions.  Overall, this evidence suggests that Delaware firms are able to attract 
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directors who have greater demand for their services; the liability protections that the state offers 
may contribute to this.  We note the average tenure of Delaware directors is lower than for firms 
incorporated in other states.   
We also present evidence on shareholder influence.  Delaware firms have significantly 
greater institutional ownership and blockholdings, suggesting that their boards may face greater 
external scrutiny, which may translate into greater pressure to terminate underperforming 
CEOs.13  All of these governance characteristics are significantly different from Delaware for 
both the California HQ subsample and the Other HQ subsample. 
We also find significant differences in measures that may influence the CEO’s likelihood 
of being terminated.  Combining the CEO and Chair position may reflect either greater 
bargaining power wielded by outsider candidates to become CEO or a higher quality CEO 
candidate.  Once established, CEOs may have greater influence if they also serve as Chair, or 
they may receive the Chair title as a result of prior strong performance.  In any event, combining 
those positions is likely to enhance the CEO’s job security (Goyal and Park 2002).  We find that 
Delaware firms are not significantly more likely to combine the position of CEO and Chair than 
firms incorporated in other jurisdictions.   
Looking at other CEO characteristics, Delaware CEOs have shorter average tenure, 
although the difference is only marginally significant when compared with CEOs of California 
incorporated firms.  Perhaps related, Delaware CEOs are also slightly younger.  Finally, 
Delaware CEOs hold more outside directorships, although the difference is only marginally 
significant when compared with CEOs of Other incorporated firms. 
                                                 
13 In untabulated results, we find that Delaware firms have a significantly higher G-Index than California firms, but 
lower than Other firms.  This pattern holds as well for the E-Index, which focuses on structural anti-takeover 
features.  Both indices rely in part on (and are highly correlated with) the law of the state of incorporation, so these 
patterns are expected. 
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4.2. Multivariate Analysis: Financial Characteristics 
To assess the differences identified above more rigorously, we run logistic regressions 
with the Execucomp sample using the same independent variables that we used for our 
reincorporation analysis: log of Total Assets, Book to Market, Takeover Activity, Stock 
Volatility, and R&D.  We present the results in Table 5. 
<<Table 5 here>> 
The first column presents the results of the regression using the sub-sample of California 
HQ firms.  The dependent variable is state of incorporation, with Delaware incorporation coded 
as 1, and California incorporation coded as 0.  There are some similarities in the results to the 
reincorporation results, with Takeover Activity and Stock Volatility both positive and significant 
(the latter only at the 10% level).  The coefficient for Log of Total Assets is positive with this 
sample, but it is only marginally significant.  R&D is insignificant.  Overall, we find some 
support for the proposition that California HQ firms incorporated in Delaware have 
characteristics that might give rise to liability concerns. 
The second column presents the results of the regression using only firms incorporated in 
Delaware.  The dependent variable is HQ: California or Other.  Thus, this regression allows us to 
see if California HQ firms opting for Delaware differ from firms in Other states that make the 
same choice.  The California HQ firms have greater Stock Volatility and more R&D, perhaps 
suggesting greater liability concerns.  Total assets for California HQ firms are smaller, but this 
difference is only marginally significant.  Other differences are insignificant. 
4.4 Multivariate Analysis: Governance 
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In this section, we investigate differences in governance characteristics among Delaware, 
California, and Other firms more rigorously. We note that there is potential endogeneity between 
incorporation choice and governance, but valid instruments are difficult to find in this context.  
Given that we are testing the race to the bottom hypothesis, however, we are primarily interested 
in describing how Delaware firms’ governance differs from that of firms incorporated in other 
states, not in drawing causal inferences.  Accordingly, we rely on OLS and logit regression 
models for this analysis based upon the type of dependent variable.   
We use two samples for each regression model: 1) California HQ firms; and 2) all 
Execucomp firms.  We include an indicator variable for Delaware incorporation, our main 
variable of interest, as an independent variable in all governance variable regressions.  We 
present the results of these regressions in Table 6; Panel A shows the results for the California 
HQ sample, and Panel B presents the results for the entire Execucomp sample. 
<<Table 6 here>> 
We begin with our regressions for director characteristics.  The first regressions use the 
retainer for outside directors as its dependent variable.  For our independent variables, we 
include the log of Total Assets because directors of larger firms are likely to be paid more.  We 
use book to market and firm age to proxy for the firm’s advising needs.  We also include an 
indicator variable, Post-SOX, which corresponds to the years 2002-2009 in our sample, when 
listing requirements mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act circumscribed governance choices.  
The second regression uses the average tenure of the outside directors as its dependent variable. 
The third regression uses the average number of board seats held by outside directors as its 
dependent variable. Ferris et al. (2003) present evidence that firm performance affects the 
number of directorships held by an individual, which they call the “reputation effect.”  Critics, 
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however, might contend that highly paid directors are being paid for acquiescence, and busy 
directors may be stretched too thin (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006).   
The Delaware coefficient is positive and significant for the director retainer and 
directorships regressions.  Delaware directors are paid more and more likely to hold additional 
board seats, supporting the notion that Delaware directors have greater demand for their services.  
We note that individuals who serve on multiple boards are most likely to be concerned about the 
potential for personal liability because each additional board membership increases the threat of 
liability.  The significant negative coefficient for the Post-SOX variable suggests that service on 
multiple boards has diminished since 2002.  The Delaware coefficient is negative and significant 
for the tenure regression, indicating that Delaware directors have shorter tenure.  
Our next set of regressions looks at institutional ownership, which may be one motive for 
incorporating in Delaware (Daines, 2002),14 but may also provide external pressure to terminate 
an underperforming CEO.  Our model predicting institutional block ownership is based on the 
institutional ownership model specification in Gompers and Metrick (2001).  They use four 
variables to proxy for institutions’ preference to invest in “prudent” stocks: firm age, dividend 
yield, S&P membership, and stock-price volatility. They also use firm size and market to book to 
proxy for institutions’ preference to own liquid stocks.  Since institutions appear to prefer 
“momentum” stock, the prior year’s stock return is also used as control variable.  We use the 
same independent variables to predict institutional and block ownership, except that we omit the 
S&P membership from the list, since our sample consists of relatively large firms.  The Delaware 
                                                 
14 This point is supported by anecdotal evidence from corporate lawyers, who say that they counsel clients to 
reincorporate in Delaware before their IPOs because Delaware law provides a known quantity for investors 
attempting to evaluate the firm (Klausner, 1995).  Delaware law is predictable because of the large body of 
precedents to which its courts can look in deciding cases and Delaware’s experienced and expert judges who sit on 
its Court of Chancery (Fisch, 2001).  Delaware incorporation allows investors evaluating firms to economize on 
information costs, which may be important if they have a large number of portfolio companies.   
22
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 93 [2008]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art93
  22
coefficient is insignificant for both regressions for the California sample, but positive and 
significant for the Execucomp sample.  For this sample, Delaware incorporation correlates with 
institutional ownership, suggesting that firms succeed in attracting institutional investors when 
they incorporate in Delaware.   
The growth characteristics of Delaware firms imply that directors of those firms need to 
be concerned about liability risks, and thus, protections against personal liability.  The next 
regression assesses whether Delaware firms are more vulnerable to lawsuits, using securities 
class actions as our measure of lawsuits.  The model for securities class actions is based on Ferris 
et al. (2003).  They use firm size to proxy for the notion that firms with “deep pockets” are more 
likely to be sued.  We also include book to market as a proxy for growth characteristics because 
failing to launch new products or meet earnings expectations can be a trigger for lawsuits.  Prior 
literature (Johnson et al., 2007) has also documented that stock price volatility and share turnover 
– key factors for loss causation and damages – are major determinants of lawsuits, so we include 
these variables in the regression.  The Delaware coefficient is insignificant in both models, 
suggesting that Delaware firms are no more likely to be sued after we control for the 
characteristics that affect incorporation choice.  This finding suggests that Delaware firms may 
have anticipated their greater potential exposure to lawsuit, based on their financial 
characteristics, at the time they made their choice of incorporation.  Recall from our discussion 
above that Delaware incorporation cannot limit the incidence of such suits, which arise under 
federal law; Delaware law only provides assurance that directors will not face personal liability.  
The race to the bottom hypothesis would suggest that assurance against liability may promote 
laxity in monitoring.  We do not find evidence to support that hypothesis here, however, as 
Delaware firms are no more likely to be sued for securities fraud. 
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Finally, we examine CEO characteristics that might be thought to affect the likelihood of 
a CEO’s involuntary termination, including the combination of CEO-Chair positions, the number 
of outside directorships held by the CEO, whether the CEO is a firm founder, and the CEO’s 
tenure.  In a succession process, the promotion of the CEO to the additional post of Chairman 
may depend on his prior performance.  The number of directorships held by the CEO might be 
thought of as an outside assessment of the CEO’s strategic skills, or as a proxy for valuable 
contacts.  CEOs who are also founders may have developed credibility with their boards because 
of their role in building the company.  Finally, the board may also let CEOs continue on their 
jobs based on prior performance, so longer tenure may reduce the likelihood of termination.   
We base the model for CEO-Chair duality on Linck, et al. (2008).  They use CEO age as 
an independent variable since the addition of the chairman position has been documented to be 
part of the planned succession process.  Such a promotion is likely based on performance, so we 
include the stock performance of the firm as an independent variable.  As in Linck et al. (2008), 
we use book to market ratio to proxy for the CEO’s firm-specific information.  We also include 
CEO tenure as an additional measure of the firm-specific ability of the CEO.  We use the same 
variables in our CEO directorships regression.  We omit the CEO tenure and CEO age from the 
CEO Founder and CEO Tenure regressions.  We add firm age, however, as older firms are less 
likely to have CEOs who are also founders of the firm.  We also omit the log of total assets from 
the CEO tenure regression. 
The Delaware coefficient is generally insignificant in these models, with two exceptions.  
The Delaware coefficient is significant with a negative sign in the CEO Founder and CEO tenure 
regression for the Execucomp sample.  Delaware CEOs are less likely to be a founder, which 
suggests that they are more likely to be managed by professional managers.  Delaware CEOs 
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also have shorter tenure.  CEO tenure may not capture likelihood of involuntary termination, 
however, because it does not distinguish voluntary retirement from termination in the wake of 
poor performance. Overall, we find no evidence that Delaware CEOs are structurally less likely 
to be terminated.  An analysis of forced CEO turnover follows in the next section.  
 
5. Turnover Analysis 
In section 4 we document how the choice of Delaware incorporation relates to corporate 
governance.  In this section, we explore the relation between Delaware incorporation and the 
likelihood of involuntary CEO turnover.  Does the protection that Delaware affords against 
personal liability for directors also protect CEOs against involuntary termination, as the race to 
the bottom hypothesis would suggest? 
There is a substantial body of literature focusing on CEO turnover, which we rely on for 
our control variables, but none of these papers focus on the role of state of incorporation.  We 
begin by identifying difference in rates of turnover among jurisdictions.  We show that Delaware 
firms terminate their CEOs significantly more frequently than the average firm in our sample.  
We then use a multivariate framework to test whether the Delaware incorporation reduces the 
likelihood of CEO termination, after controlling for performance and governance factors likely 
to affect the decision.   
5.1 Identifying Forced CEO Turnover 
Execucomp provides executive names and the date they became CEO, which we use to 
identify CEOs and their turnover.  We then use Factiva to search and classify these turnovers.  
Based on the methodology in Parrino (1997), news reports which state the CEO was fired, forced 
out, or suggesting irreconcilable differences are classified as “Forced Turnover.”  If the CEO 
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leaves to join another firm, if they die, or if they retire, the turnovers are classified as unforced.  
We do not include turnover due to mergers; given the decline in hostile mergers over our sample 
period, however, very few incumbent CEOs leave immediately after a takeover.15   
5.2.  Descriptive Statistics: Turnover  
Table 7 summarizes the proportion of CEOs forced out in each of our four incorporation 
groups.  We sort the turnover by year of the CEO’s tenure (Panel A) and by firm performance 
(Panel B).  Parrino (1997) shows that CEOs with shorter tenure are more likely to be forced out.  
We focus on the relation between tenure and termination here because growth firms – such as 
those attracted to Delaware – may have CEOs with shorter tenure.  After controlling for tenure, 
how do forced turnover rates compare across jurisdictions? 
<<Table 7 here>> 
The forced turnover rates in Delaware incorporated firms are markedly higher than the 
rate for Other firms throughout the CEO’s tenure.  CEOs of California HQ firms incorporated in 
Delaware appear particularly vulnerable in the first year, with their rate of turnover declining 
sharply thereafter.  Breaking down turnover by performance, Delaware firms in the lowest 
quintile of industry-adjusted performance are most likely to terminate their CEOs.  
5.4. Regression Analysis 
The univariate statistics presented in Table 8 show that Delaware firms are more likely to 
terminate their CEOs.  However, Delaware’s corporate code, like California’s and that of other 
states, does not speak directly to the decision by the board to retain or fire top management.  If 
state corporate law influences management tenure, it seems clear that the effect is indirect, i.e., if 
the protections Delaware affords directors against liability encourages lax monitoring, this may 
                                                 
15 We earlier documented the higher incidence of Delaware firms being acquired. If turnovers related to takeover 
were included, Delaware’s rate of CEO turnover is even greater when compared to other states.  Thus, excluding 
such turnovers biases our results in favor of the race to the bottom hypothesis. 
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be reflected in the governance of those firms.  In this section we use a multivariate framework to 
examine the relation between incorporation, governance characteristics, and the likelihood of 
forced turnover.     
For our regressions we use Forced Turnover as the dependent variable in a series of 
logistic regressions.  We run separate regressions using both the sample of California HQ firms 
and the entire Execucomp sample.  The first sample allows us to directly test the race to the 
bottom hypothesis, while the latter gives greater statistical power.  We control for firm 
performance by including stock market returns for the past five years or over the CEO’s tenure, 
whichever is shorter.  We industry adjust this measure (using the Fama/French 48 industry 
classification) to filter out exogenous industry shocks.  We compute this industry adjusted return 
for each CEO-firm year and assign them into quintiles (Jenter & Lewellen, 2010).  In the first 
pair of regressions, we include our performance measure and the indicator variable for Delaware 
incorporation to assess whether forced turnover is less frequent in Delaware firms after 
controlling for performance.  In the second pair of regressions, we add an interaction variable for 
the performance measure and the Delaware indicator variable to check whether Delaware firms 
are less likely to terminate their CEOs for poor past performance.  In the final pair of regressions, 
we include governance measures that might affect the likelihood of CEO termination.  The 
standard errors presented in the table account for potential clustering at the firm level.  We 
present the results in Table 8. 
<<Table 8 here>> 
None of our tests offer support for the lax monitoring posited by the race to the bottom 
hypothesis.  For both the California HQ sample and the larger Execucomp sample, the Delaware 
indicator variable is positive and strongly significant in the first regression.  The coefficient for 
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the Delaware indicator variable is still significant at the ten percent level when we add the 
interaction variable for the Execucomp sample.  When we include the governance variables in 
the third set of regressions, the Delaware coefficient is positive, but insignificant.  This result 
supports the notion that the influence of incorporation choice on the turnover decision is indirect.  
In no specification is the Delaware coefficient negative, as the race to the bottom hypothesis 
would suggest. 
The results indicate that a number of the governance variables shown above (in Table 6) 
to correlate either positively or negatively with Delaware incorporation also correlate with the 
likelihood of forced CEO turnover in the same direction.  For the variables relating to board 
structure, director retainer is significant.  Better paid directors appear more likely to terminate 
CEOs for poor performance.  The coefficient for multiple directorships is negative, but only 
marginally significant in the California HQ sample.  Overall, these results do not support the 
proposition that Delaware encourages lax monitoring by directors.   
The coefficient for institutional ownership is negative, but insignificant.  This result does 
not support the proposition that institutional owners pressure directors to terminate 
underperforming CEOs.  The Class Action coefficient is positive in the regressions for both 
samples, although only significant for Execucomp sample.  The positive coefficient for Class 
Action suggests firms sued by their investors have a reputational concern above and beyond poor 
performance.  Recall from Table 6, however, that Delaware firms are no more likely to be sued. 
On the other side of the termination decision, the coefficient for CEOs who are awarded 
the Chair position is negative for both samples, as predicted, but it is only significant for the 
larger Execucomp sample.  CEOs who are founders of the firm are less likely to be terminated.  
These CEO characteristics may be consistent with management protection, although they are 
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also consistent with directors having more information about the incumbent CEO, and 
consequently, being less swayed by recent firm performance.  In any event, we saw in Table 6 
that CEOs of Delaware firms are no more likely to hold the Chair position or be a founder.  
Finally, CEOs who have longer tenure are less likely to be terminated, although the coefficient is 
only significant for the Execucomp sample.  Again, in Table 6 we saw that Delaware CEOs do 
not have longer tenure.  In sum, CEO characteristics associated with lower forced turnover are 
not associated with Delaware incorporation. 
5.5 Robustness checks 
We do a number of tests (untabulated) of the robustness of our conclusions.  First, we 
substitute a linear industry-adjusted performance measure for the performance quintile used in 
the regressions reported in Table 8.  The coefficients and their significance for these regressions 
are qualitatively similar.  An earlier version of this paper used a sample extending from 1993 to 
2004 and we found similar results, so our central findings are not time dependent.  Finally, we 
rerun the regressions presented in Table 8 excluding financial institutions from the sample; 
financial institutions face a substantially different regulatory regime, which may affect turnover.  
Moreover, financial institutions are unlikely to incorporate in California.  The results for these 
regressions are qualitatively unchanged.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This study focuses on the relation between a firm’s state of incorporation and forced CEO 
turnover.  We focus on Delaware, the overwhelming winner in the competition for corporate 
charters, and California, the conspicuous loser.  The race to the bottom hypothesis suggests that 
Delaware lures companies from California by protecting directors against liability, which may 
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encourage lax monitoring.  Our results are inconsistent with that hypothesis.  Our findings 
suggest that Delaware firms are no less likely to terminate their CEOs than firms incorporated in 
California or other states.  Moreover, we show that a number of governance characteristics 
associated with a greater likelihood of CEO termination are also associated with Delaware 
incorporation.  We caution, however, that we do not examine how turnover affects firm 
performance, so we draw no conclusions about whether Delaware boards are making efficient 
termination decisions; we only say that Delaware boards are not lax in making those decisions. 
What do these results tell us about the competition among states for corporate charters?  
Although the statistical methods we have used cannot show causality, a likely impossible task 
given the inherent noisiness of measures of governance quality, we believe that showing even an 
association of Delaware incorporation to governance choices and outcomes is relevant to the 
debate over state incorporation.  Overall, we conclude that our findings do not support the race to 
the bottom hypothesis.  The overwhelming winner in the competition for corporate charters, 
Delaware, has not achieved its dominant market share by promoting lax monitoring of CEOs.     
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Total Assets In millions – (at). 
 
Book to Market Ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity 
– (equity/csho*prcc_c).  
 




Amount of research and development, scaled by sales – 
(xrd/sale). 
 
Dividend Yield Cash Dividend divided by market capitalization – 
div/(prcc_c*csho). 
 
CRSP   
  
Firm Age Number of years since first date of trading on CRSP. 
  
Stock Volatility Standard deviation of monthly stock returns estimated over the 
last two years (Year −2 and Year −1) prior to the current fiscal 
year (Year 0).  
 
Stock Turnover Average Monthly Turnover (Volume / Shares Outstanding). 
  
Momentum Raw return over the past 12 months. 
  
Long-run Returns Past five-year return or the return over the CEO’s tenure, 
whichever is shorter.  Adjusted for returns in the Fama-French 
industry during the period. 
  
IRRC / Execucomp   
  
Director Retainer Cash compensation paid to directors.  Since this data is not 
available after 2005, we substitute Cash-fees scaled by a 
multiplier.  The Multiplier is calculated as the average ratio of 




Mean number of outside directorships per outside director. 
CEO Tenure 
 
Number of years since CEO took office. 
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CEO-Chair Dummy variable equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of 
the board; zero if the positions are separated. 
 
CEO Directorships Number of outside directorships held by the CEO. 
  
Board Size Number of members in the board of directors 
  





Takeover Activity Total value of transactions reported on SDC in the prior year 
for a given Fama-French industry divided by the sum of assets 
for all firms with positive total assets on Compustat in that 
industry. 
 
Class Action Federal securities class actions, as reported by Securities Class 
Action Clearinghouse. 
 
Institutional Ownership Percentage of shares held by institutions; Spectrum data from 




Number of 5% institutional owners. 
Post-SOX Indicator variable equal to one for observations after the 





Current CEO is a founder of the company, as reported in 
company’s proxy statement. 
 
Forced Turnover Similar to methodology in Parrino (1997). Indicator variable 
equal to one if newspaper reports indicate that CEO was forced 
out, if the board mentions dissatisfaction with firm 
performance, if there are disagreements between the CEO and 
the board of directors, or if the departure is unexpected and no 
particular reason was provided for the departure; zero 









Reincorporations: Summary Statistics 
 
Table below presents summary statistics of firms that reincorporate after their IPO. Reincorporations during the 
years 1992-2010 are identified primarily from Factiva news searches and then verified with information in SEC 
filings. Reincorporations from and to a foreign country, and firms that do not have a CRSP share code of 10 or 11 
are excluded from the sample. Panel A presents the number of firms that change incorporations from one state to 
another, classified by whether the firm is headquartered in California or not.  Panel B presents means and medians 
(in parentheses) of the financial characteristics of firms the year prior to their reincorporation.  Panel C summarizes 
hand collected governance characteristics the year prior to the reincorporation. Variable definitions are in the 
Appendix. The last four columns in Panel B and the last two columns in Panel C present t-statistics from two-sample 
t-tests and z-values (in parentheses) from rank-sum tests comparing differences between two groups.  Italics, Bold 
Italics, and Bold, represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Summary of Reincorporations 




CA HQ firms 
CA → DE 
Other → DE  
CA → Other 
DE → Other 
DE → CA 
Other → CA 
















Total CA HQ  79 142 
 
Other HQ firm  














Other → CA 
DE→Other 
(HQ State) 
Other → Other 
(HQ State) 
Total Other HQ 
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Panel B: Characteristics of reincorporating firms 








 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(1) (5)-(3) 
          
Total Assets 650.89 511.48 867.96 1,171.58 4,531.01 −0.34 0.48 0.89 11.47 
 (65.54) (37.30) (168.07) (83.809) (206.14) −1.93 3.66 1.08 0.19 
Book to Market 0.448 0.434 0.830 0.663 0.599 −0.18 3.72 3.72 −2.37 
  (0.296) (0.365) (0.672) (0.502) (0.456) 0.55 4.72 3.73 −3.54 
R&D 0.225 0.175 0.049 0.151 0.156 −0.73 −2.69 −1.38 3.21 
  (0.081) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) −2.53 −4.80 −3.06 3.08 
Operating Performance 0.094 0.012 0.115 0.020 0.042 −1.54 0.50 −1.94 −4.34 
  (0.121) (0.103) (0.133) (0.062) (0.010) −1.65 −0.31 −2.39 −1.09 
Firm Age 5.01 4.50 6.039 6.27 6.27 −0.69 0.98 1.74 0.23 
  (4.40) (4.01) (6.471) (5.20) (5.05) −0.13 1.37 1.88 −0.13 
Stock Volatility 0.182 0.183 0.134 0.175 0.167 0.14 −2.69 −0.36 3.40 
  (0.171) (0.174) (0.119) (0.149) (0.140) 1.16 −2.68 −0.52 2.39 
Stock Turnover 0.115 0.097 0.090 0.120 0.167 −2.93 −1.75 −1.95 3.51 
  (0.079) (0.061) (0.069) (0.081) (0.140) −2.99 −3.06 −2.40 2.95 
Takeover Activity 0.086 0.086 0.034 0.063 0.129 0.05 −3.21 −1.71 4.57 
  (0.031) (0.027) (0.023) (0.018) (0.094) −1.35 −3.23 −3.64 1.46 
Institutional Ownership (%) 32.98 23.07 33.86 27.18 39.74 −2.50 0.18 −1.80 1.49 
  (28.36) (13.12) (26.84) (18.99) (35.66) −3.02 0.21 −2.14 1.37 








Panel C: Measures of internal governance pre-reincorporation 




Board Size 6.65 6.59 7.59 −0.15 2.06 
  (6) (6) (7) −0.44 2.12 
% Outsiders 76.96 80.99 76.06 0.69 −0.09 
  (75.74) (84.52) (76.39) 0.60 0.00 
Multiple Directorships 0.68 0.65 0.45 −0.25 −1.67 
  (0.50) (0.50) (0.33) −0.65 −1.51 
Director Tenure 5.81 4.66 7.04 −1.73 1.29 
  (5.8) (3.90) (5.9) −1.84 1.08 
CEO Directorships 0.17 0.13 0.17 −0.44 −0.03 
  (0) (0) (0) −0.31 0.40 
CEO Tenure 8.55 6.71 9.54 −1.22 0.42 
 (5.07) (3.96) (9.28) −1.09 0.69 
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Table 2 
Logistic regressions predicting the decision to reincorporate  
 
Table below presents the marginal effects (computed at the mean) from logistic regressions predicting the decision 
of firms to reincorporate. The reincorporation sample used in these regressions is described in Table 1. Clustered 
Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are shown in parentheses. Column (1) includes only California HQ firms.  
The dependent variable equals ‘1’ if the firm reincorporates in Delaware and zero otherwise.  The sample used for 
regression in Column (2) contains the sample of Delaware incorporated firms that remain in Delaware and the 
sample of firms that move from Delaware. The dependent variable equals ‘1’ if the firm stays in DE and zero 
otherwise.  Characteristics of reincorporating firms are measured in the year prior to the reincorporation.  Variable 
definitions are in the appendix. Italics, Bold Italics, and Bold, represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 CA HQ → DE 
and 
CA HQ: CA 
DE 
and 
from DE → 
 (1) (2) 
Constant −19.64 5.729 
 (0.758) (0.715) 
Log (Total Assets) 0.067 0.058 
 (0.058) (0.063) 
R&D 0.021 0.000 
 (0.088) (0.086) 
Book to Market −0.354 −0.413 
 (0.278) (0.113) 
Takeover Activity 0.722 5.093 
 (0.320) (2.471) 
Stock Volatility 1.535 3.550 
 (0.590) (2.049) 








Headquarters and Incorporation 
 
The table shows the frequency of firms’ headquarters state and the state in which they incorporate.  The sample 
includes all firm-years for which CEO data is available on Execucomp from1993-2009.  Only firm-years with 
positive total assets on Compustat and CRSP share code of 10 or 11 are included in the sample. Foreign firms 
incorporated in the US and US firms incorporated in foreign countries are excluded.  Panel B shows the frequency 
(percentage of firms in the corresponding incorporation state sample) of CRSP delisting codes of the firms in our 
sample at the end of 2009.   
 
 
Panel A: Incorporation and Headquarters 
 
Incorporation Headquarters 
 DE CA Other Total 
DE 108 3,660 13,251 17019 
CA 0 581 36 617 
Other 11 216 10,935 11,162 
Total 119 4,457 24,222 28,798 
 
Panel B: Survival rates for firms in sample  
 
Incorporation Trading in 2009 Mergers Exchanges Liquidations Dropped Total 
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Table 4 
Summary characteristics of firms based on their state headquarters and state of incorporation 
 
This sample contains all firm-years for which CEO data is available on Execucomp from 1993 to 2009.  Only firm-
years with positive total assets on Compustat and CRSP share code of 10 or 11 are included.  Foreign firms are 
excluded regardless of incorporation.  The first two columns present characteristics of California HQ firms based on 
their state of incorporation. Firms in Column (1) are incorporated in Delaware.  Firms in column (2) are 
incorporated in California. Columns (3) and (4) summarize information for non-CA HQ firms that are incorporated 
in Delaware and Other states, respectively. The last four columns compare the differences in characteristics between 
these groups.  ‘t’ values presented are from 2-sample t-tests and the z-values shown in parentheses are from 
Wilcoxon rank sum tests comparing the groups (Chi-squared when testing proportions). Variables are defined in the 
appendix.  Italics, Bold Italics, and Bold, represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (2)-(1) (4)-(1) (4)-(1) (4)-(3) 
Total Assets 5,623.7 3,987.0 13,215.6 9,895.3 −2.46 8.85 6.14 −5.48 
 (680.80) (400.96) (1,291.8) (1,302.8) (−2.39) (20.69) (20.34) (0.19) 
Book to Market 0.435 0.486 0.504 0.537 2.83 8.92 13.21 6.09 
 (0.35) (0.42) (0.42) (0.47) (4.72) (12.06) (19.76) (11.44) 
R&D 0.124 0.082 0.036 0.023 −6.90 −34.35 −31.57 −11.12 
 (0.08) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (−7.15) (−43.70) (−48.01) (−8.77) 
Firm Age 14.88 17.913 19.75 26.19 4.00 18.21 40.53 28.03 
 (11.03) (12.11) (13.30) (23.06) (3.41) (11.57) (36.50) (36.06) 
Dividend Yield 0.004 0.010 0.011 0.017 7.38 27.29 49.33 29.90 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (7.00) (28.05) (44.39) (32.48) 
Stock Volatility 0.155 0.137 0.118 0.103 −5.08 −22.31 −31.51 −18.77 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (−4.29) (−25.30) (−36.18) (−21.97) 
Stock Turnover 0.136 0.113 0.035 0.001 −2.47 −33.41 −45.46 −30.80 
 (0.10) (0.04) (0.01) 0.02 (−6.16) (−36.41) (−50.96) (−34.93) 
Takeover Activity 0.076 0.046 0.055 0.044 −7.39 −9.05 −13.98 −7.93 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (−7.19) (−18.62) (−23.61) (−7.89) 
Momentum 0.278 0.254 0.195 0.173 −0.63 −4.52 −5.82 −2.65 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.62) (0.03) (0.15) (0.15) 
Director Retainer 23.20 20.02 25.76 22.13 −4.94 4.91 −3.19 −8.50 
 (20.00) (20.00) (24.00) (20.00) (−3.51) (8.05) (−4.18) (−18.55) 
Director Tenure 6.855 8.241 7.107 8.160 5.59 3.08 15.55 19.39 
 (6.43) (7.56) (6.67) (7.71) (5.21) (2.35) (15.04) (20.83) 
Multiple Directorships 0.933 0.681 1.002 0.888 −6.42 3.63 −2.50 −9.38 
 (0.88) (0.59) (0.89) (0.80) (−6.71) (2.12) (−4.21) (−9.69) 
Institutional Blocks 2.006 1.827 1.971 1.719 −2.94 −1.37 −11.10 −15.22 
 (2.00) (1.50) (1.80) (1.50) (−3.80) (−2.28) (−12.23) (−15.83) 
Institutional Ownership 62.34 57.54 63.26 57.84 −4.57 2.13 −10.67 −20.41 
 (65.65) (60.49) (65.86) (58.81) (−4.84) (0.91) (−12.07) (−21.40) 
Class Action 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.67 5.90 33.92 21.32 
CEO Tenure 7.70 8.68 7.07 7.91 2.29 −4.54 1.44 9.37 
 (5.51) (5.33) (5.00) (5.59) (−0.71) (−5.65) (0.18) (9.15) 
CEO Age 53.93 55.06 54.97 55.36 2.88 7.12 9.59 3.93 
 (54.00) (55.00) (55.00) (55.00) (3.00) (8.26) (10.84) (3.55) 
CEO-Chair 0.46 0.51 0.35 0.35 2.89 94.67 89.83 0.02 
CEO Directorships 0.492 0.364 0.590 0.633 −2.96 4.26 6.17 1.86 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (−2.19) (4.64) (5.97) (1.39) 
Founder CEO 0.24 0.34 0.21 0.22 31.34 22.23 3.96 14.41 
N 3,660 581 13,359 10.982     
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Logistic regressions of incorporation 
 
Table presents the marginal effects from logistic regressions predicting the incorporation of California firms in 
Delaware.  We construct the sample using Execucomp firms during the years 1993-2009.  Only firm-years with 
positive total assets on Compustat and CRSP share code of 10 or 11 are included in the sample. Foreign firms 
incorporated in the US and US firms incorporated in foreign countries are excluded.  In all the regressions, Delaware 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of ‘1’ for California headquartered firms that are incorporated in Delaware, 
and zero otherwise.  The sample used in the regression results in Columns (1) contains only the sample of all 
California HQ firms.  Column (2) uses all the firms that are incorporated in Delaware.  Italics, Bold Italics, and 
Bold, represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 CA HQ: DE & 
CA HQ: CA 
CA HQ: DE & 
Other HQ: DE 
 (1) (2) 
Log (Total Assets) 0.018 −0.012 
 (0.010) (0.007) 
Book to Market −0.016 −0.016 
 (0.031) (0.018) 
R&D 0.027 0.260 
 (0.035) (0.027) 
Stock Volatility 0.381 0.412 
 (0.199) (0.112) 
Takeover Activity 0.385 0.045 
 (0.123) (0.030) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 4,246 17,212 
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Table 6 
Governance Characteristics of Delaware Incorporated firms 
 
Table below presents the results from regressions predicting governance based on state of incorporation. Delaware is a dummy variable that takes the value of ‘1’ if 
the firm is incorporated in Delaware, and zero otherwise.  Panel A includes observations of California HQ firms incorporated in either California or Delaware. Panel 
B includes all Execucomp firms. We obtain information on Director Retainer and CEO tenure from Execucomp, Institutional Ownership information from Thomson 
Reuters; remaining governance data are from IRRC. The sample period is from 1993 to 2009, but IRRC measures are available only from 1996. Class Action and 
CEO-Chair are predicted using logistic regressions; other governance measures are predicted from OLS regressions. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 
Variables are defined in the Appendix.  Italics, Bold Italics, and Bold, represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
42
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 93 [2008]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art93
  42





















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Constant −4.906 7.213 0.050 2.117 38.180 −0.119 −3.905 −0.358 −0.045 7.781 
 (1.698) (0.977) (0.135) (0.263) (4.790) (0.019) (0.877) (0.268) (0.470) (1.372) 
Delaware  2.317 −1.161 0.232 0.197 3.416 −0.008 0.0937 0.107 −0.505 −0.416 
 (0.954) (0.640) (0.080) (0.131) (2.157) (0.008) (0.333) (0.100) (0.322) (1.224) 
Log (Total Assets) 3.305 0.001 0.111 −0.139 1.925 0.0144 0.169 0.086 0.013  
 (0.270) (0.108) (0.018) (0.037) (0.644) (0.002) (0.064) (0.021) (0.076)  
Book to Market −0.290 0.115 −0.197 0.599 −7.632 −0.030 −0.170 −0.211 0.007 −0.045 
 (0.582) (0.497) (0.061) (0.123) (1.989) (0.009) (0.266) (0.078) (0.165) (0.512) 
Firm Age 0.030 0.057  −0.004 0.003    −0.023 0.058 
 (0.034) (0.014)  (0.004) (0.068)    (0.012) (0.032) 
Dividend Yield    −8.444 −132.2      
    (4.254) (67.290)      
Stock Volatility    0.545 16.31 0.016     
    (0.123) (2.273) (0.007)     
Stock Turnover    −0.080 0.952      
    (0.023) (0.367)      
Momentum    −4.046 −92.810 0.326     
    (0.451) (8.214) (0.0558)     
Post-SOX 4.967  −0.105        
 (0.571)  (0.042)        
CEO Tenure       0.091 −0.008   
       (0.023) (0.005)   
CEO Age       0.047 0.006   
       (0.014) (0.005)   
Long-term Returns       0.143 −0.026 0.025 −0.325 
       (0.067) (0.011) (0.030) (0.097) 
Year Dummies No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,477 2,365 2,113 3,752 3,752 3,872 2,128 1,906 4,200 3,778 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Constant −4.575 8.175 −0.076 2.170 44.86 −0.118 −4.419 −1.129 0.975 8.521 
 (0.880) (0.354) (0.054) (0.091) (1.703) (0.009) (0.337) (0.121) (0.195) (0.316) 
Delaware  3.214 −0.831 0.107 0.194 3.237 0.002 0.010 −0.0371 −0.302 −0.870 
 (0.459) (0.143) (0.026) (0.036) (0.611) (0.002) (0.079) (0.033) (0.099) (0.279) 
Log Total Assets 3.031 −0.089 0.147 −0.164 1.076 0.013 0.220 0.119 −0.206  
 (0.138) (0.041) (0.007) (0.011) (0.221) (0.001) (0.024) (0.010) (0.029)  
Book to Market 0.594 0.00363 −0.153 0.634 −2.729 −0.019 −0.141 −0.113 0.021 −0.222 
 (1.926) (0.131) (0.022) (0.043) (0.690) (0.003) (0.077) (0.029) (0.078) (0.224) 
Firm Age 0.056 0.0354  0.001 0.081    −0.026 −0.017 
 (0.012) (0.004)  (0.001) (0.019)    (0.004) (0.006) 
Dividend Yield    −10.62 −246.1      
    (1.101) (18.70)      
Stock Volatility    −2.239 −75.11 0.342     
    (0.273) (6.227) (0.038)     
Stock Turnover    0.323 11.00 0.015     
    (0.038) (0.654) (0.003)     
Momentum    −0.140 0.124      
    (0.013) (0.194)      
Post-SOX 5.553  −0.151        
 (0.330)  (0.015)        
CEO Tenure       0.079 −0.000   
       (0.008) (0.002)   
CEO Age       0.058 0.014   
       (0.005) (0.002)   
Long-term Returns       0.117 −0.035 −0.005 −0.298 
       (0.051) (0.014) (0.006) (0.058) 
Year Dummies No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 25,008 17,279 15,096 25,801 25,801 26,556 15,707 13,727 25,969 25,969 
R-squared 0.073 0.056 0.144 0.203 0.326 0.028 0.108 0.081 0.070 0.006 
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CEO Turnover and State of Incorporation 
 
The table presents the forced and unforced turnover of CEOs in Execucomp firms. Turnover data is hand collected 
using news searches. The classification of forced turnover is based on a procedure similar to Parrino (1997).  There 
are 4283 CEOs in the sample.  Panel A presents the percentages of CEOs who leave their office before their tenure 
reaches the number of years shown. Panel B presents the turnover percentages based on the CEO’s long-run 
performance, measured as the industry adjusted performance over the past five years or over the CEO’s tenure, 
whichever is shorter, and then assigned to quintiles. Only CEOs in Execucomp firm years are included; turnovers 
following mergers are excluded.  ‘Total’ is the fraction of CEOs who are turned over during our 1993-2009 sample 
period.  Columns 1-4 shows turnover percentages for the sample of California HQ firms that are either incorporated 
in California (columns 1-2) or in Delaware (columns 3-4). Columns (5)-(8) reports these percentages for Other HQ 
firms based on whether they are incorporated in Delaware (columns 5-6) or whether they are incorporated elsewhere 
(columns 7-8). The last two columns reports turnover percentages for all Delaware incorporated firms. 
 
Panel A: CEO Turnover and CEO Tenure 
Years CA HQ, CA CA HQ, DE Other HQ, DE Other HQ, Other DE 
 Forced Unforced Forced Unforced Forced Unforced Forced Unforced Forced Unforced 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
<2 0.57 2.28 1.29 2.36 0.88 2.22 0.57 1.95 0.96 2.26 
2-3 0.19 0.57 0.34 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.26 0.23 0.28 0.31 
3-4 0.19 0.19 0.28 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.25 0.23 
4-5 0.00 0.19 0.46 0.21 0.31 0.27 0.16 0.27 0.35 0.26 
5-6 0.00 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.31 0.11 0.39 0.20 0.28 
6-7 0.19 0.19 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.28 0.13 0.33 0.24 0.28 
7-8 0.38 0.19 0.31 0.25 0.17 0.35 0.11 0.39 0.18 0.34 
8-9 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.25 0.12 0.31 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 
9-10 0.00 0.19 0.06 0.25 0.14 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.12 0.30 
>10 0.19 1.14 0.61 1.07 0.39 1.47 0.44 1.78 0.42 1.39 
 
Panel B: CEO Turnover and Firm Performance 
Lowest Quintile 0.95 1.14 1.96 1.78 1.34 1.36 0.90 1.03 1.48 1.46 
2 0.19 0.95 0.77 1.10 0.68 1.21 0.55 1.44 0.67 1.20 
3 0.38 0.76 0.43 0.46 0.41 1.17 0.26 1.45 0.42 1.04 
4 0.19 1.14 0.25 0.80 0.24 1.27 0.26 1.31 0.24 1.17 
Highest Quintile 0.00 1.14 0.40 0.98 0.27 1.11 0.16 0.87 0.29 1.07 









The table presents marginal effects (evaluated at the mean) from logistic regressions predicting forced CEO 
turnovers.  The dependent variable equals 1 if the CEO is forced out in the fiscal year and 0 otherwise. Performance 
is measured as the industry adjusted performance (using only the sample of Execucomp firms) over the past five 
years or over the CEO’s tenure, whichever is shorter, and then assigned to quintiles. During turnover year, 
performance of replaced CEO is calculated to the month of departure and incoming CEOs performance is measured 
from the month they take office.  Reported standard errors in all regressions account for clustering at the firm level 
and are shown in parentheses.  Models shown in the first three columns uses the sample of firms that are either 
incorporated in California and Delaware. The last three columns report results based on our complete sample of 
Execucomp firm years.  Italics, Bold Italics, and Bold, represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 CA HQ Firms All Execucomp firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Delaware 0.0078 0.0056 0.0094 0.0056 0.0040 0.0022 
 (0.0029) (0.0041) (0.0110) (0.0017) (0.0024) (0.0032) 
Performance −0.0068 −0.0098 −0.0143 −0.0108 −0.0118 −0.0091 
 (0.0010) (0.0042) (0.0131) (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0017) 
Delaware*Performance  0.0029 0.0058  0.0014 0.0008 
  (0.0038) (0.0120)  (0.0015) (0.0020) 
Director Retainer   0.0006   0.0003 
   (0.0002)   (0.0001) 
Multiple Directorships   −0.0093   −0.0024 
   (0.0054)   (0.0016) 
Institutional Ownership   −0.0002   −0.0000 
   (0.0002)   (0.0001) 
Class Action   0.0221   0.0419 
   (0.0188)   (0.0101) 
CEO-Chair   −0.0027   −0.0057 
   (0.0064)   (0.0025) 
CEO Directorships   −0.0003   0.00002 
   (0.0006)   (0.0002) 
Founder CEO   −0.0217   −0.0141 
   (0.0060)   (0.0023) 
CEO Tenure   −0.0051   −0.0028 
   (0.0035)   (0.0014) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,785 3,785 1,662 26,001 26,001 12,305 
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